This paper is concerned with the issue of side payments between content providers (CPs) and Internet service (access bandwidth) providers (ISPs) in an Internet that is potentially not neutral. We herein generalize past results modeling the ISP and CP interaction as a noncooperative game in two directions. We consider different demand response models (price sensitivities) for different provider types in order to explore when side payments are profitable to the ISP. Also, we consider convex (non-linear) demand response to model demand triggered by traffic which is sensitive to access bandwidth congestion, particularly delay-sensitive interactive real-time applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality continues to be debated as its core economic issues as described in, e.g., [9] , have not been resolved. The debate concerns all participants in the enormous and growing Internet economy: Internet service (access) providers (ISPs), content providers (CPs, including providers of cloud computing services), end-user consumers, and government regulators. In Figure 1 , the subscribers of ISP1b directly pay ISP1b and content provider CP2. CP2's Internet service provider, ISP1a, is different from ISP1b. The financial arrangements at the peering points where the two ISPs exchange traffic are typically "neutral" in the sense that they are based on traffic This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1116626.
aggregates and not on the (application) type of traffic 1 [6] , [2] or its origin. Another question of neutrality is whether CP2 also pays ISP1b for access to its subscribers. In the absence of such a "side payment", ISP1b might be disincentivized to locally cache "remote" content providers like CP2, potentially gaining revenue at the ISP-to-ISP peering points at the expense of additional downloading delays experienced by ISP1b's subscribers. We use a game-theoretic framework to study neutrality issues, an approach to networking research that has received enormous attention since the survey [1] .
In the following, we will not consider alliances between independent CPs and ISPs (i.e., "eyeball" ISPs, whose revenues may need to be dispersed by, e.g., the use of Shapley values [13] , [14] ).
Also, we will not consider the role of advertising revenue [15] in Figure 1 . Indeed, instead of directly subscribed revenues, CPs may earn advertising revenue, e.g., [2] (obviously, the subscribers ultimately pay by buying the advertised merchandise or services). Note that ISPs have pointed out that endusers do not necessarily "request" of the CPs the advertising which the CPs insert into content, and have argued for sharing of advertising revenue either through side payments from CPs or for the right to insert their own ads into downloaded content (the arrangements among the different parties of broadcast television service may be analogous to the latter scenario).
In the following, we do not extend the model of Figure 1 to study content exchanged peer-to-peer, which is expected to employ only best-effort (i.e., not usage-priced) service and, in practice, is often in violation of copyright. The enormous traffic volume associated with p2p activity was one of the original motivators of the neutrality debate [4] , and issues of piracy continue to be developed, e.g., [17] . Multiple types of content were previously modeled in, e.g., [6] .
Finally, we do not consider user migration among multiple ISPs of the same type as in, e.g., [6] .
In this paper, we consider the simpler model of side payments depicted in Figure 1 on an end-user platform ( [10] , [15] developed games involving end-users and content providers on 1 Note that differentiated service (diffserv) among application types is "neutral" if requested by end-users, whereas application diffserv implemented unilaterally by an ISP is not application neutral (whether implemented at ISP peering points or at end-user access points, and even if for altruistic purposes, e.g., to give more bandwidth for putative interactive real-time applications). an ISP platform). We review the case of a noncooperative ISP-CP game based on a communal demand response for providers of both types in Section II. The case of different, though coupled, demand responses for each type of provider is given in Section III to explore the issue of profitability of side payments. In Section IV, we consider a convex demandresponse corresponding to acceleration in the demand for reserved bandwidth by delay-sensitive (particularly interactive real-time) applications once access bandwidth is congested; the case of a communal demand response is taken here to simplify analysis. In Section V, we consider an example of a differentiable, convex demand-response for side-payments 2 between two different types of providers. Finally, we conclude in Section VI with a short summary.
II. BACKGROUND: COMMUNAL DEMAND RESPONSE OF AN

END-USER PLATFORM
Suppose there are two providers, one content (CP indexed 2) and the other access (ISP indexed 1). Also, the communal consumer demand [8] is assumed to be
where d is demand sensitivity to the price, p 1 and p 2 are, respectively, the prices charged by the ISP and CP, and D max > 0 is the demand at zero usage based price 3 . The revenue of the ISP is
where p s is the side payment from content to access provider. Similarly, the revenue of the CP is
Consider a noncooperative game played by the CP and ISP adjusting their prices, respectively p 2 and p 1 , to maximize their respective revenues, with all other parameters fixed 4 . The question whether the ISP will profit from side payments is not trivial because the side payment will naturally cause the CP to raise its prices thus lowering overall demand. The short proof of following simple result follows from [3] , [6] and is included here in order to subsequently relate it to the principal results of this paper. We assume that the ISP will decide that it profits from side payments only if this profit is strictly increasing in p s at p s = 0. Theorem 1. At the interior Nash equilibrium 5 , requiring
the ISP does not profit by the introduction of side payments.
Note that the sign of p s may be negative, i.e., the side payment is from ISP to CP (i.e., remuneration for content instead of access bandwidth). Proof: The conditions for Nash equilibrium are:
So, the Nash equilibrium plays are
Based on the previous two displays, we can see the requirement of (3) for an interior Nash equilibrium (i.e., p * 1 , p * 2 > 0 and D * > 0).
The ISP's revenue at this Nash equilibrium is
So, U * 1 does not depend on p s , i.e., it is constant, so not strictly increasing at p s = 0.
In [6] , we showed that the the ISP may actually experience a reduction in revenue/utility with the introduction of side payments, using a communal demand model that had different demand-price sensitivity parameters d per provider type and also multiple providers of each type. Such a model was also considered in [2] . The following section fleshes this out for a special case.
III. DIFFERENT DEMAND RESPONSE DEPENDING ON
PROVIDER TYPE
Several other previous works have used a communal demand function for both content and access bandwidth even though these are two different commodities with different dimensions. This said, demand for content and access bandwidth may be coupled in that pricing of one will affect the other.
So, consider two different, coupled demand responses for providers of type k ∈ {1, 2}:
where we have maintained the same (a single) price sensitivity d k for each type of demand D k for simplicity. For example, the ISP's demand could be in terms of Mbps= [D 1 ] while the, e.g., music CP's demand could be in terms of songs/s= [D 1 ]. The point is that a single song's size could vary from say 3 − 15MB so, though correlated, the CP and ISP demands are different.
A. Side payments as a function of consumed access bandwidth
Suppose the side payments based on consumed access bandwidth are factored as follows:
Again, in this setting, we wish to find conditions on the of demand sensitivities d i and usage-based side payment price p s such that side payments are of value to the ISP.
Theorem 2. The introduction of bandwidth based side payments (5) will profit the ISP if and only if either
Proof: Let p = p 1 + p 2 and δ k = D max,k /d k . After solving the first order conditions ∂U k /∂p k = 0, k ∈ {1, 2}, we get that at Nash equilibrium,
Thus, at Nash equilibrium,
So,
This quantity is positive at p s = 0 if and only if (6) or (7) hold.
So, in this setting, positive side payments are not necessarily profitable to the ISP (player 1).
B. Discussion
Potentially different sensitivities to each price for each type of demand were considered in [12] , i.e., D k = D max,k − d k,k p k − d k,3−k p 3−k for k ∈ {1, 2}, as well as competition among multiple providers, thus extending the previous two theorems. There it was found that the ISP may not profit by the introduction of positive side payments, depending on the parameters in play, but numerically this was only the case when there was only one provider of each type.
More generally, U * 1 is a complex nonlinear function of p s where it is possible that U * 1 (p s ) might be greater than U * 1 (0) for some sufficiently large p s notwithstanding ∂U * 1 ∂ps (0) < 0. We expect that side payments will be simply rejected by ISPs in the event that ∂U * 1 ∂ps (0) < 0.
C. Discussion: Side payments as a function of consumed content
Instead of (5), suppose side payments are based on content and factored as follows:
Because total revenue U 1 + U 2 is a constant function of p s , the ISP's profit is at the CP's expense, i.e., ∂U * 1 /∂p s > 0 if and only if ∂U * 2 /∂p s < 0. So, the latter condition is similar to that of Theorem 2 with the indices swapped and the resulting modified conditions (6) or (7) are for profitability of the content provider.
Corollary 1. The introduction of content based side payments will be profitable to the content provider (i.e., a loss for the ISP) if and only if
IV. ACCESS BANDWIDTH CONGESTION AFFECTING
DEMAND RESPONSE
For simplicity, in this section we return to the communal demand response scenario of (1) and (2) . In the following section, we will consider an example of different demand responses for the problem context of this section.
Suppose that there are two broad classes of applications, one of which is significantly sensitive to congestion of access bandwidth, e.g., delay-sensitive interactive real-time applications. Assume that applications of the other, best-effort type are unlikely to engage in usage based-pricing for access bandwidth. As pricing reduces, the demand for access-bandwidth reservation increases, so causing additional congestion so that besteffort service will be increasingly inadequate for congestionsensitive applications. Therefore, the demand for usage-priced access-bandwidth reservation may accelerate with reduced price. More specifically, say there is positive threshold
such that overall demand sensitivity to price is greater when D ≥ D θ than when D < D θ . That is, for
a convex, piecewise linear model for access bandwidth would be
so that D(p θ ) = D θ , see Figure 2 .
So, in this model, in the price range [p θ , p max ] (demand range [0, D θ ] equivalently) corresponds to low demand sensitivity to price, d θ . The pricing range [0, p θ ] (demand range [D θ , D max ]), when delay-sensitive applications typically need to adopt usage-priced (reserved or priority) access-bandwidth service, corresponds to higher demand sensitivity to price, d max .
1) Interior Nash equilibrium points: Let p := p 1 + p 2 so that We take three cases for an interior Nash equilibrium point (NEP) (p * 1 , p * 2 ) based on comparing p * := p * 1 + p * 2 to p θ .
Case p * > p θ : Adding the first order necessary conditions here gives p * = 2D max /(3d max ). Checking "consistency" with the case condition requires
then an interior NEP is p * 1 = p * /2 − p s and p * 2 = p * /2 + p s .
= p θ and |ps| < p * /2, (11) then an interior NEP is p * 1 = p * /2 − p s and p * 2 = p * /2 + p s .
Case p * = p θ . Here, for an interior NEP, ∂U k ∂p k | p θ − > 0 and ∂U k ∂p k | p θ + < 0 for k = 1, 2. That is, we have the following constraints on p 1 + p s : (12) where we have also used 0 < p * 1 ≤ p * = p θ (the equality for this case).
For (10) and (11) , the issue of profitability of side payments for the ISP (player 1) is just as in Theorem 1.
A. Numerical examples for piecewise-linear demand response
Consider the numerical example where D max = 2.5 · D θ = 1, d max = 5d θ = 1 (both set equal to 1 without loss of generality). So, p θ = (1 − 0.4)/1 = 0.6. Condition (10) clearly holds, giving the corresponding NEP if |p s | < p * /2, but conditions (11) and (12) cannot hold.
For a second numerical example, take D max = 6D θ = 1 and d max = 6d θ = 1. In this example, (10) and (12) cannot hold. Here, p * = 2/3 < 5/6 = p θ , so (11) does hold giving the corresponding NEP if |p s | < p * /2. For a final numerical example, take D max = 4D θ = 1 and d max = 5d θ = 1. Here, p θ = (1 − 0.25)/1 = 0.75 and p max = p θ + D θ /d θ = 2. In this example, (10) and (11) do not hold; but when p s < 0.5, (12) reduces to
That is, there is a Nash equilibrium line segment (p * 1 , p * 2 ) such that p * 1 satisfies (13) and p * 2 = p θ − p * 1 = 0.75 − p * 1 . In Figure  4 , we depict for the case where p s = 1/8 the vector field ( ∂U1 ∂p1 , ∂U2 ∂p2 ) as a function of (p 1 , p 2 ), corresponding to "betterresponse" time-differential, synchronous-play Jacobi dynamics [11] , [18] ,
of this noncooperative game between ISP and CP. V. DIFFERENTIABLE, CONVEX DEMAND MODEL We can also consider a convex, differentiable demand model that can approximate (9), specifically
where p = p 1 +p 2 . Here, α ≥ 1 and given d max > d θ > 0 and 0 < D θ < D max , p max may be found using D (0) = −d max and D ((D) −1 (D θ )) = D (p θ ) = −d θ , In this section, we study the system described above for this model of demand response.
A. Interior Nash equilibria and side-payments under different demand-response for each type of provider Theorem 3. At interior Nash equilibrium for a strictly convex demand response,
where p * = p * 1 + p * 2 solves 2D(p * ) + p * D (p * ) = 0.
and |p s | < p * /2.
Proof: Again, (16) is the sum of the first-order conditions for a NEP, k ∂U k /∂p k = 0. Conclude by substituting p * into each first-order condition to obtain (15) .
For the example of (14) with α > 1,
Again, note that under communal demand-response, neither p * = p * 1 + p * 2 nor U * 1 depend on p s . This is obviously not necessarily the case when the demand-response for ISP and CP are different as in the previous section and [12] . So, now suppose for this example that the CP and ISP demands differ, but only in the D max parameter, i.e., U 1 = D max,1 (1 − (p 1 + p 2 )/p max ) α (p 1 + p s ), U 2 = D max,2 (1 − (p 1 + p 2 )/p max ) α p 2 − D max,1 (1 − (p 1 + p 2 )/p max ) α p s .
For this example, at the interior Nash equilibrium ∂U * 1 ∂p s (0) = D max,1 ( α 2+α ) α (D max,2 − D max,1 )(1 + α) D max,2 (2 + α) .
So, the introduction of access-bandwidth based side payments will be profitable to the ISP, i.e., A similar result can be likewise derived for content-based sidepayments.
VI. SUMMARY
In summary, we considered two different problems modeling demand response in an access network game. The first was to explore the profitability of side payments under (reasonably) different demand response for ISP and CP. We found that side-payments from the CP to the ISP were not unconditionally profitable for the ISP. The second problem analyzed a convex demand response (taken to be communal to simplify analysis) that was used to model the onset of demand for access bandwidth by delay-sensitive applications once the access is sufficiently congested. Note that the former problem is one pertaining to the network neutrality debate, while the latter problem setting would be application neutral if preferential treatment (service priority or bandwidth reservations) of applications by the ISP is performed at the behest of the consumer/user.
